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COMMENTS
[I]t is of the very essence of the separation of power and function that
each organ is primarily concerned with and responsible for the performance
of its own function; and if in its opinion it must to perform it properly exer-
cise a certain discretion or make a certain judgment it will do so regardless
of . . . presumptive limitations.' 2 0
We do not propose that the courts should annex the foreign office. Usually
the issue touching on foreign affairs will be involved only incidentally in a
litigation in which the court is ultimately responsible for the judgment. Only
rarely will there be an issue of direct interference with the executive. An
examination of some of the cases does show ... that a formulistic r~sum6 will
not succeed.' 2'
The judiciary is charged with the decision of litigations brought before it
in a given way. It decides these conflicts by a technique which it has devel-
oped by projecting particular litigations into the entire scheme of the legal
and social order. The judiciary, of course, is not alone in its concern with the
legal and social order. The executive and the legislature each in its own way
have like aims and purposes, but there will surely be places where one mode
of procedure offers larger gains than another, and in the last analysis it is for
the particular organ to decide this. If its own mechanisms seem superior, it
will and should ignore ... presumptive limitations. 122
120 Jaffe, JUDIcIAL AspEcrs oF FOREIGN RELATIONS 234 (1933).
121 Id. at 39.
122 Id. at 234-35.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-SOME ASPECTS
INTRODUCTION
The concept of sovereign immunity developed from the common law
in England. The present status of the concept in America is to some extent
inexplicable. In medieval times, the king was immune from suit on the
ground that he was in power by divine right. Because he was considered
the organ of God, he was deemed incapable of doing wrong. In about
the thirteenth century, the king's immunity became predicated upon his
position as highest lord in the feudal system. Later the king was thought
to be human, fallible and subject to God and the law. Even with this
change the king retained his immunity from suit. As chief of the feudal
system no court had enough power to enforce a judgment against him.
After the breakdown of the feudal system, the king's immunity from suit
persisted and the maxim that the "king could do no wrong" came to stand
for the notion that a sovereign was incapable of doing wrong.'
"Just how an immunity, which had its roots in feudalism and in a po-
litical philosophy associated with the divine right of kings, was trans-
I Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).
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planted to the new republic in America remains something of a mystery."'2
A partial solution to this mystery is found by an examination of the finan-
cial condition of the states in the years immediately after the Revolution.
Certainly the young republic could not financially afford tort liability.3
The English notion that a sovereign was incapable of doing wrong was
repudiated in America. However, sovereign immunity, in the sense that
the government is immune from any suit to which it has not consented,
became part of American Jurisprudence. 4
It is important to note the development of the law which has slowly
waived sovereign immunity in America. The United States abandoned the
principle of immunity from suit in contract cases, at first, by allowing
parties injured to recover by appeal to Congress, and then, by enactments
giving Courts of Claims and District Courts jurisdiction to decide these
cases.5 Soon after the waiver of immunity in contract cases, suits against
the federal government for patent infringements and maritine torts were
authorized. 6 Further, federal agencies were given the power to settle
claims for property damage in amounts up to $1,000. Though the waiver
of sovereign immunity to this extent came during the nineteenth century,
the waiver of immunity from suit for tort claims was slow in coming.7
If one were damaged through the negligent or tortious act .or omission
of a government employee, his only recourse was to seek relief by ap-
pealing directly to Congress.8 To so restrict one injured by tort was
justified in the name of public policy. The view was that servants of the
government were but servants of the law who acted for public good.
However, when they departed from its authority, they were without
power to bind their master.9 Therefore, by referring to public benefit and
public policy, the retention of sovereign immunity in tort cases was justi-
fied by courts and legislative bodies.10
Because appeal to Congress was the sole remedy for damages inflicted
by government employees acting within the scope of their employment,
the expansion of government enterprises caused claims for damages to
2 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1609 (1956).
347 COLUM. L. REV. 722 (1947).
4 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
5 Annot., A.L.R. 2d 222, 224 (1948).
6 35 U.S.C.A. § 68, 46 USCA §§ 741, 742 (1958).
7 Unsuccessful attempts to pass a general tort claims act were made in 1929, 1940, and
1942. Note, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
8 German Bank v. United States, 148 U.S. 573 (1893); Whiteside v. United States,
93 U.S. 247, 23 Wall. 882 (1876).
0 Moffat v. United States, 2 U.S. 24 (1884).
10 Supra note 7.
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burden Congress. To relieve itself of the burden and to effectuate the
principle that the loss should fall on he who can best bear it, Congress,
in 1946 passed the Federal Tort Claims Act."
With certain exceptions the FTCA may be said to be a general waiver
of governmental immunity insofar as it affects liability for claims arising
from the negligence of governmental employees.' 2 While the federal
government has consented to being sued, consideration must be given to
the procedural and substantive requirements which limit that consent.
Remnants of the abandoned sovereign immunity continue in the limita-
tions of the FTCA. The procedural and substantive limitations, imposed
by Congress and fortified by judicial decision, present a formidable ob-
stacle to one seeking recovery under the FTCA. In the following pages
of this article an analysis of the limitations and interpretations thereof will
be given.
THE GENERAL WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
The FTCA, passed in 1946, waived the immunity of the federal gov-
ernment insofar as it existed with respect to liability for a torts of officers
or employees. The act amounted to the consent to be sued under the
modern concept of sovereign immunity. In 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b), exclusive
jurisdiction for Tort Claims against the government was conferred upon
Federal District Courts.
[C]ivil actions or claims against the United States, for money damages ...
for injury or loss of property, or for personal injury or death caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act of omission
occurred, are to be brought in the District Courts of the United States.'8
That the damages be caused by a "negligent or wrongful act or omis-
sion" is implicit of a broader waiver than in reality has been given. Express
exceptions to the waiver preclude actions for all but negligent torts.14
In 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) the waiver is said to be inapplicable to suits involv-
ing assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference
with contract rights.15 After once narrowing the waiver so that it amounts
11 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411,
2412, 2671-2680 (1958).
12 Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Md. 1947).
'3 Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 101 (1951), 28 U.S.C. S 1346 (b) (1958).
14 Ekberg v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 99 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813
(S.D. Cal. 1947).
15 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1958).
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to consent to be sued only for negligence, analysis becomes somewhat
less complex.
Actions may be brought against the federal government for the negli-
gence of officers or employees. Who are officers or employees within
the meaning of the act is a question requiring solution. The act defines
"Employees of the Government" as including officers or employees of
any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces, and persons
acting in an official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the service
of the United States, whether serving with or without compensation.'
In Campbell v. United States, 7 a sailor traveling pursuant to govern-
ment orders accidentally injured an elderly woman. The sailor bumped
into her as he ran to catch a train. The court held that the sailor was
acting within the scope of his employment within the contemplation of
the FTCA. Whether one is acting in an official capacity or within the
scope of his employment is a question of fact which is often difficult to
resolve. The diversity of roles played by members of the military has
caused the necessity to determine their status. Courts have held that
members of the National Guard who have not been called into the active
service are not employees within the meaning of the FTCA.18 On the
other hand, members of the armed forces assigned to colleges and univer-
sities to carry out the Reserve Officers Training Corp program, are
employees within the purview of the FTCAl9
The government's liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act is de-
rived from the doctrine of respondent superior.20 The relationship neces-
sary to cause government liability is that of master and servant.2 1 While
the United States Government may not be held liable under the FTCA
for the negligence of an independent contractor,2 2 the government is
liable for its own negligence in the same manner that an employer of an
independent contractor is liable for his own negligence under applicable
16 Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 106 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1958).
'7 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948).
18 Storer Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 251 F. 2d 268 (5th Cir. 1958); Gross v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. N.Y. 1959); Larkin v. United States, 118 F. Supp.
435 (N.D. N.Y. 1952); Lederhouse v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 217 (W.D. N.Y. 1954);
Smart v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Okla. 1953); Clark v. United States, 109
F. Supp. 213 (D.C. Ore. 1952); United States v. Parger, 251 F. 2d 266 (5th Cir. 1958).
19 Bellview v. United States, 122 F. Supp. 97 (D.C. Vt. 1954); Bombard v. United
States, 122 F. Supp. 294 (D.C. Vt. 1954); Leonard v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 694
(D.C. Wyo. 1955).
20 National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F. 2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954); Brooks v. United
States, 152 F. Supp. 535 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).
21 Noe v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
22 Hopson v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Ark. 1956); Strangi v. United
States, 211 F. 2d 305 (5th Cir. 1954).
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local law.2 3 The problem of determining the relationship between the
negligent party and the government is made more difficult by the existence
of quasi-governmental agencies. Generally, employees of such agen-
cies are not considered governmental employees within the meaning of
the FTCA. Public benefit corporations (quasi-governmental agencies),
as for example the Civil Air Patrol, are not considered federal agencies
and their employees are not government employees.24
The phrase which indicates that the United States should be liable if a
private person would be liable is capable of being misunderstood. It was
thought in the past that this phrase limited the liability of the United
States to situations where only a private person would be liable, i.e. where
no private person conducted similar activity the government could not
be liable. Since no one but the government maintained an army, it was
reasoned that liability could not attach from this operation.25 This early
misconception was corrected in Indian Towing Co. v. United States.26
The court decided that the provision in the FTCA imposing liability in
the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances does not exclude liability in performance of activities
which private persons do not perform.
The liability of municipal, state, and local governments has been deter-
mined on the distinction between the function giving rise to the cause of
action. That is, there can be no liability for a purely governmental func-
tion whereas liability attaches when the cause of action arises from a
proprietary function. In Rayonier Inc. v. United States,2 7 the court denied
the need to distinguish between governmental and proprietary functions
under the FTCA. Although the purpose of the FTCA was to accept
liability in circumstances where private liability already existed, the re-
sults from case law were that causes of action were created where none
had theretofore existed. 28
A claim or suit under the FTCA can only be based on an act or
wrong which, under the law of the place of its commission, gives rise to
a cause of action.29 This language establishes local law as the determinant
23 Benson v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
2 4 Pearl v. United States, 230 F. 2d 243 (10th Cir. 1956).
25 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
26350 U.S. 61 (1955).
27 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
28 United States v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 227 F. 2d 385 (1st Cir. 1955);
Sir Transp. Associates v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955); Rayonier Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
29 McMullan v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. N.Y. 1947); Campbell v. United
States, 75 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1948); Wade v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 729 (D.C.
Mass. 1948); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2d 62 (U.S. App. D.C.
1955).
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in analyzing whether or not the negligent or wrongful act is actionable.
In the case of Spall v. United States30 the law of Florida, made it the duty
of the operator of an automobile on a highway at night to stop his car,
if because of the bright lights of an approaching car, he could not see
another automobile on the highway ahead of him. Florida law deems
failure to comply with this duty to be actionable negligence. This statute
was held applicable in an action against the United States where a motorist
was fatally injured in a collision with a navy bus operated on a Florida
highway.
This direction of the FTCA to apply local law presents serious diffi-
culty where a conflict of laws question arises. In Eastern Air Lines v.
Union Trust Co.-" the government was held liable for death of airplane
passengers, arising from a collision over the District of Columbia proxi-
mately caused by the negligence of a government tower operator in
Virginia. The general conflict of laws rule disregards the law of the place
of the negligent act or omission and instead uses the law of the place of
injury. The rule under the FTCA has been interpreted to use the law of
the place where the negligent act occurred.
While the application of state law has been illustrated in a great number
of cases, the act supercedes local law where that law is in direct conflict
with the provisions of the act.' 2 In Burkhardt v. United States3" the court
permitted a suit for wrongful death to be brought more than a year after
the commission of the wrong. The action was allowed even though the
state law provided that the bringing of suit within a twelve-month period
should be a condition precedent to recovery. The state law conflicted
with the provision for limitations in the FTCA in that the FTCA pro-
vided that actions were to be brought within one year of the injury or
within one year of the passage of the act, whichever was later.34
To summarize: the waiver of immunity provides remedies for negligent
acts of officers or employees who act within the scope of their employ-
ment. The remedy is to be based on the law of the place where the negli-
gent act was perpetrated. The limitation that the government is liable
only where an individual would be liable does not preclude recovery
where the activity carried out by the government is not carried on by
individuals. An analysis of the waiver is incomplete without considering
the express and implied exceptions of the act.
83 72 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Fla. 1947).
31221 F. 2d 62 (1955); Grey v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 869 (D.C. Mass. 1948).
82 Kohn v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
83 165 F. 2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947).
84 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW AT TORTS 165-67 (1956).
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EXPRESS EXCEPTIONS TO WAIVER
At present there are thirteen express exceptions to the waiver of im-
munity under the FTCA.3 5 One of the exceptions, limiting the actions to
those sounding in negligence has already been mentioned.36 Of the re-
maining, the one pertaining to the military will be dealt with subsequently
as a separate subject.3 7 The exceptions to the waiver of immunity have
resulted from either or both of the following two theories: (1) The re-
tention of some degree of sovereign immunity, (2) that liability should
not arise under this act when the government provides compensation
under separate acts.
The first exception to the waiver of immunity consists of two parts.
The first part denies liability for "any claim based upon an act or omission
of an employee of the government, exercising due care, in the execution
of a statute of regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid ... " The second part of this first exception denies liability for
claims . . . "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused."38 Interpretations to the first part of this
first exception have caused many problems. In Powell v. United States39
Federal Range Agents appropriated, sold and destroyed Indians' horses
while purporting to act under authorization from federal statutes. They
did this with complete disregard for the property rights of the Indians.
The government denied liability on the ground that the Range Agents
were acting under a statute. Though injuries caused by the enforcement
or administration of statutes do not generally give rise to a cause of action,
where that enforcement or administration is without "due cause" the
government may be held liable. Due care requires at least minimum
concern for the rights of others. The Range Agents gave no notice and
acted beyond their authority; they did not show the required minimum
concern and were held to be acting without due care. The government
was held liable under the FTCA.
This first part of the first exception to the waiver of immunity has been
criticized and attacked as unnecessary. It is apparent that to hold officers
or employees for doing their duty would frustrate the governmental
35 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958).
36 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C.A. S 2680 (h) (1958);
United States v. Taylor, 236 F. 2d 649 (6th Cir. 1956); Anglo American & Overseas
Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 635 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
37 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (j) (1958).
38 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (a) (1958).
39 233 F. 2d 851 (10th Cir. 1956).
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process. However, it is not apparent that to hold the government liable
for injuries arising from the administration of law frustrates anything.
By holding the government the loss generally falls on the one who can
best bear it.40
The second part of this first exception which excludes liability arising
out of the performance of discretionary functions has given rise to con-
troversy. "No one contends, that liability should extend to the conse-
quences of a legislative or executive decision of a political nature, or that
the propriety of such a decision should be reviewed by the courts."'41
Acts of Congress are discretionary and are excepted from the waiver of
immunity. So long as the act of Congress is carried out with due care, the
government retains immunity. The confusion results in trying to classify
governmental functions as discretionary or non-discretionary. While can-
ceding that acts of Congress are discretionary and that acts of the janitor
raking leaves on the Capitol lawn are non-discretionary, borderline cases
present frustrating problems. The borderline cases have caused inconsist-
ency to appear in the decisions.
A test suggested, distinguishes between the decision to perform work,
on the policy level and the decision of how to perform on the operational
level. The decisions of the policy level are said not to give rise to govern-
mental liability while decisions on the operational level are said to be
within the purview of the waiver. When one decides to enter into a
project just what does he decide? Surely the decision to so enter is gen-
erally accompanied by decisions concerning the method of completing
the project. Do the decisions as to the methods of completing fall within
the discretionary acts contemplated in the exception to waiver?
In Dalehite v. United States4 2 plaintiff's husband was killed when a ship
exploded during the loading of fertilizer pursuant to a federal agricultural
rehabilitation plan. The Court held that the discretionary function or
duty includes more than the introduction of programs and activities. It
also includes determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there
is room for policy judgment and decision, there is discretion. The Dalehite
case held discretionary not only the high-level policy decision to use
ammonium nitrate for fertilizer and to ship it abroad for agricultural
rehabilitation after the war, but also the decisions (1) to refrain from
further experiments to determine whether the fertilizer was explosive, (2)
to use a certain type bag and to pack at a certain temperature, (3) to load
without warning of danger. The damages for which the government
402 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTS 1656-57 (1956).
41ld. at 1657.
42 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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would have been liable perhaps influenced the Court. To allow recovery
in the Dalehite case would have opened the door to numerous claims for
large amounts of money.43
The Dalebite decision has been criticized on the ground that the denial
of recovery was based on apprehensions of subsequent litigation and not
a proper interpretation of the act.44 However, it had continued to rep-
resent the view the Court takes when large amounts on threatened suits
are involved. In Batholomae Corp. v. United States45 the Court held that
the second part of this first exception includes as discretionary, deter-
minations made by executives in establishing plans or schedules or op-
erations. The Court further commented that where there is room for
policy, judgment and decision there is discretion. The Bartbolomae case
involved damage caused by atomic testing. The public benefit from such
testing and the possibility of litigation and expense if recovery was al-
lowed seemed to prompt the Court to apply the rule from the Dalehite
case.
The limitation of government liability indicated in Dalebite and
Bartholomae seems greater than it is. Other cases of the same period adopt
a more liberal distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary
and extend governmental liability. In Indian Towing Co. v. United
States46 the Coast Guard failed to discover and repair a non-functioning
lighthouse and otherwise failed to warn ships. The Court held that the
decision to maintain the lighthouse was discretionary while the decisions
made as to maintenance were non-discretionary. Because the damages
were incurred from the negligent performance of non-discretionary
functions the government was held liable. The distinction drawn between
discretionary and non-discretionary, that is, that the former involves
decisions to undertake a project and the latter involves lower level deci-
sions on the operational level, has been sanctioned by a number of cases.47
Important in this first exception to the waiver of immunity are: (1)
the requisite "due care" in the exercise of statutes or regulations. With-
out this due care the exception would not apply and the government
would be liable despite the fact that the employees purported to act
under a statute or regulation. (2) In the second part, the difference be-
tween discretionary and non-discretionary has caused inconsistency in
43 See In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F. 2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952).
44 66 HARv. L. REv. 488 (1953); Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 52 Micn. L. REv. 733 (1944).
45 135 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
46 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
47 Eastern Air Lines Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F. 2d 62 (10th Cir. 1955); Friday
v. United States, 239 F. 2d 701 (9th Cir. 1957); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F. 2d
819 (8th Cir. 1956).
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the cases. Though courts have disagreed in result, the decisions of policy
level officers or employees are said to be discretionary and the decisions
of operational level officers or employees are non-discretionary. 48
The second exception to the waiver of immunity derives governmental
liability for "any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter. ' 49 It has been suggested that this
second exception is superfluous in that it could have been implied from
the first part of the first exception. 50 The suggestion was based on the
fact that postal employees act pursuant to statutes and their negligence
would not cause liability. Part one of the first exception in effect retains
immunity from suit where the damage arises from the administration of
a statute while exercising due care.5 ' The suggestion of the superfluous
aspect of this second exception apparently does not consider "due care."
Whether or not due care is shown, the government is immune from suit
under this second exception.
The third exception to the waiver of immunity denies liability for "any
claim arising in respect of the assessment of collection of any tax, customs
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise on any other law enforcement officer. 52 This exception
has also been called superfluous. 53 Such a contention seems to be without
merit in that the first part of the first exception requires due care to re-
lieve the government of liability and here the government is relieved
without consideration of due care.
The fourth exception to the waiver of immunity denies governmental
liability for certain admiralty claims for which remedies are provided by
separate statutes.54 The fifth exception denies governmental liability for
claims arising out of the administration of 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-31. 55 This ex-
ception was made so that in the administration of the National Security
Act the requirement of due care should not be necessary. The sixth excep-
tion denies recovery on any claim caused by the imposition or establish-
48 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
4 9 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (b) (1958).
50 Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
51 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a) (1958).
52 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (c) (1958); Alliance
Assur. Co. v. United States, 252 F. 2d 529 (2d Cir. 1958).
53 Comment, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
54 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (d) (1958). The
remedies provided appear in 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52, 781-90 (1958).
55 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (e) (1958); 50
U.S.C. §§ 1-31.
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ment of a quarantine by the United States.56 The seventh exception was
referred to earlier as limiting claims to those arising from negligence.
57
The eighth exception to the waiver of immunity denies liability for
claims arising from the fiscal operations of the treasury or from the
regulation of the monetary system.5 8 The ninth exception applies to the
military and will be dealt with separately.
The tenth exception to the waiver denies liability for "any claims aris-
ing in a foreign country."59 The term "foreign country" refers to all
lands other than those for which Congress is the supreme legislative body.
Claims arising in such foreign countries cannot be recovered regardless
of how much control over that country has been exercised by the exec-
utive.60 A country occupied by our military forces is still a foreign
country.
The eleventh and twelfth exceptions deny liability for claims arising
from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority"' and the Panama
Canal Company.62 The thirteenth exception to the waiver denies liabilities
for claims arising from the activities of federal land banks, federal inter-
mediate credit banks or banks for cooperatives.63
The exceptions to the waiver of sovereign immunity expressly provided
for should be narrowly construed so as to allow all claims contemplated
by Congress. 4 Claims not expressly excluded from the operation of the
act must be held to have been intended to be included.65
THE MILITARY
Since 1946 and the passage of the FTCA, the claims have to a great
extent involved the military forces of the United States. Claims of civilian
third parties arising out of the combatant activities of the military, naval
forces, or the Coast Guard during time of war do not give rise to a cause
56 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (f) (1958); Harris v.
United States, 154 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Ky. 1957).
57 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1958).
58 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (i) (1958).
59 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (k) (1958).
60 Straneri v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Pa. 1948); Spelar v. United States,
75 F. Supp. 967 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
61 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1) (1958).
62 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (m) (1958).
63 Federal Tort Claims Act. 74 Stat. 389 (1959), 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (n) (1958); Brunnell
v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
64 Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948); Jefferson
v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D.C. Md. 1947); Insurance Co. of No. America v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va. 1948).
65 Wojciuk v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
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of action under the FTCA.6 6 However, claims by civilian third parties
will be allowed for damages arising from the -training or practice for
combat even during time of war.6 7 The term "combatant activities" as
used in the express exception to the waiver of immunity in reality refers
to actual conflict. Where there is no actual conflict the government is
liable for negligent action of members of the military of naval forces
which causes damage to civilians. 8
The ability of members of the military or naval forces to recover for
injuries under the FTCA presents another question. Servicemen can re-
cover under the FTCA for injuries not incident to their service.,, On the
other hand, servicemen cannot recover under the FTCA for injuries
sustained in combat.70 The inability of servicemen to recover under the
FTCA, for injuries from combatant activities, is based on the existence of
government insurance. Injuries to servicemen sustained outside the scope
of their duty and inflicted by a negligent officer or employee of the
government give rise to a remedy under the FTCA. When servicemen
are so injured they cannot recover under the FTCA for amounts received
as military benefits. That is, servicemen so injured cannot benefit twice.7 1
Though in certain instances servicemen are precluded from recovery
under the FTCA because of their status they are not precluded from
recovering for consequential damages for injuries to their wives or chil-
dren.72
The position of military personnel in relation to the FTCA has been
discussed extensively and yet the cases are not consistent.73
NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED LIABILITY
The purpose of the FTCA was to waive the government's traditional
all encompassing immunity from tort action and to establish novel and
unprecedented government liability.74 In Friedman v. Lockheed Aircraft
66 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 1038 (1950), 28 U.S.C. S 2680 (j) (1958); United
States v. Hambleton, 185 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950); United States v. Tayor, 236 F.2d 649
(6th Cir. 1956).
67 Skeels v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 372 (W.D. La. 1947).
68 Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D.C. Md. 1947).
69 United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
70 Buer v. United States, 241 F. 2d 3 (7th Cir. 1956).
71 Knecht v. United States, 242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1937); Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135 (1950).
72 Messer v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 512 (D.C. Fla. 1951); Costley v. United States,
181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950); Herring v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 69 (D.C. Colo. 1951).
7 3 Annot., A.L.R.2d 1448 (1958); Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952); Annot., 64 A.LR.2d
679 (1959).
74 Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
COMMENTS
Corp.7 5 the court held that the government could be found liable under
FTCA76 for wilful, wanton or gross negligence, but could not be held
for punitive damages.
Though the government may be liable for wilful, wanton or gross neg-
ligence the cases have held that the government cannot be liable under
the theory of absolute liability.77 That is, the government cannot be liable
for the maintenance of an inherently dangerous activity. On the other
hand, the government could be held for claims arising from damages from
atomic testing.
The advent of the atomic bomb and its propensity to do damage has
resulted in claims under the FTCA. In two cases recovery under FTCA
was denied for damages from atomic explosions. However, by way of
dicta it was suggested that under a proper set of facts recovery could be
had. In Bullock v. United States78 and in Bartholomae Corp. v. United
States79 the dicta indicated that there could be recovery under the FTCA
if the negligent conduct was on the operational level. The court found
that the alleged negligence arose from the policy level decisions and was
not actionable. Implied in the decisions was the fact that if the operational
level employees were negligent, recovery would be allowed. If an atomic
blast was caused by a negligent employee, the government would be liable
under the FTCA unless the court chose to deny such liability because of
threatened financial burdens or litigation. It seems unlikely that recovery
would be had, considering the view of discretion expressed in the Dalehite
decision.80 The courts have not followed the Rayonier case.81 In that case
the court held that the possibility of composing a heavy burden on the
public treasury is no justification to read exceptions into the waiver of
immunity beyond those provided by Congress.
FTCA-APPLIED
Where the claim against the United States does not exceed $2,500, the
FTCA confers authority upon the head of each federal agency or his
designee to consider, ascertain, adjust, determine and settle the claim. The
award or determination so made is said to be final, except where procured
75 138 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
76 Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C. S 2674 (1958).
77 Porter v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. S.C. 1955); Rayonier Inc. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
78 133 F.Supp. 885 (D.C. Utah 1955).
79 253 F. 2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957).
80 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
81 Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957).
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by fraud. 82 The head of the agency may, as part of an award determine
and allow reasonable attorney fees. If the award is $500 or more the fees
shall not exceed ten percent of such award. The fees are to be paid out
of, but not in addition to the award. Any attorney who charges more than
ten peir cent may be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or
both. 83
The FTCA grants original jurisdiction to the Federal District Courts.
The jurisdiction conferred includes jurisdiction to determine any set off,
counterclaim, or other claim or demand of the United States against any
plaintiff.84 The court is to sit without a jury.8  Successful claimants are
allowed to recover costs for fees paid to the clerk, and fees actually in-
curred for witnesses.86 The court rendering judgment for a plaintiff may
as part of such judgment allow reasonable attorney's fees. If the judgment
is over $500 not more than twenty percent of the judgment may be al-
lowed. The fees allowed are to be payable out of, but not in addition to,
the judgment. Any attorney who charges more than twenty percent may
be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned up to one year, or both.87
Where a claim has been presented to a federal agency, no suit may be
instituted until that agency has made final disposition of the claim. How-
ever, a claimant may on fifteen days written notice withdraw the claim
from the agency and commence suit in the proper District Court.88 The
suit then cannot be in excess of the claim withdrawn from the agency
except where the increased amount of the claim is shown to be based on
newly discovered evidence or on intervening facts.89
Though the Judiciary Act90 requires that the amount in controversy in
suits in District Courts be $10,000 it is not operative to preclude actions
under the FTCA for less. Congress expressly gave the court jurisdiction
to hear cases under the act and indicated that the amount in controversy
should not control.9 1 Where the FTCA does not provide procedure, the
8 2 Federal Tort Claims Act, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 28 U.S.C. S 2678 (1958).
83 Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1958).
84 Federal Tort Claims Act, 72 Stat. 348 (1958), 28 U.S.C. §1346 (1958).
85 Except in tax cases all actions against the United States are tried without juries,
68 Stat. 589 (1954), 28 U.S.C. §2412 (195).
86 Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 973 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1958).
8 7 Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1958).
88 Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a) (1958).
8 9 Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (b) (1958).
90 72 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C. §133 (1958).
91 Bates v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 57 (D.C. Neb. 1948).
COMMENTS
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply.92 The joinder of parties under
the act is governed by the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. 93
Neither the FTCA or the Federal Rules on Civil Procedure precludes
the joinder of equitable plaintiffs or subrogees.9 4 While the status of
subrogees and others who intervene is settled where they join in a pending
action, their right to proceed on their own has been questioned. Some
courts have denied assignees or subrogees the right to sue in their own
names on the ground that to allow such actions would be in violation of
a federal anti-assignment statute.95 Other courts have allowed subrogees
to sue in their own names on the ground that the anti-assignment statute
applies only to voluntary assignees. Subrogees are assignees by operation
of law and are not within the contemplation of the anti-assignment
statute.96 The latter view, allowing suits by subrogees, has been accepted
by a majority of the cases. 97 Suits by subrogees have been successful.
While subrogees have been allowed recovery, in states where a tortfeasor
would not be liable to the insurer subrogee in a suit in its own name the
United States would not be liable to the insurer subrogee in a suit in its
own name.
Unless appropriate action is taken under the act within the time therein
prescribed, the District Court is without jurisdiction. 98 Claims under the
act are barred unless proceeded on within one year from their accrual.
That is, suit must be filed or the claim presented to an agency within the
year following the injury. In the event a claim is made to the head of an
agency, the statute of limitations is extended for six months after the
claimant receives final determination or withdraws the claim from the
agency.9 9 Final judgments by district courts are appealable to courts of
appeal, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 10 0 If notice of appeal
filed in the district court has affixed thereto, the written consent on behalf
of all the appellees, that appeal may be taken to the court of claims. 101
92 See generally 28 U.S.C. (1958).
93 Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Md. 1947).
94 Grace v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174 (D.C. Md. 1948).
95 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. N.Y. 1948).
96 Insurance Co. of No. America v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va. 1948).
97 Niagra Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Bewick v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Cascade County v. United States, 75
F. Supp. 850 (D.C. Mont. 1948); Hill v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
98Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1958); Turkett v.
United States, 76 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1948).
99 Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 Stat. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (1958).
100 72 Stat. 348 (1958), 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958).
101 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (1958).
